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Intense debate has long persisted over a proper interpretation of the beginning
of Japanese-American hostilities during World War II. Most authorities tend
to view the clash as an almost inevitable finale to a series of increasingly
unhappy developments in the relationship between the two nations dating
from roughly the turn of the century. There is little in this interpretation
suggesting that the conflict might have been avoided. At the same time,
revisionist scholars have argued with considerable persuasion that there were
indeed alternatives to war, but that the Roosevelt Administration, convinced
that a war must be fought, chose to ignore them.1 To date, no one has
successfully resolved the issue.
Whether the holocaust which came to pass was in fact inevitable,
documents recently made available show that a group of prominent civic and
business leaders in pre-war Hawaii believed that it could be avoided and
worked diligently if fruitlessly to prevent it.2 The story of their efforts—replete
with proposals reminiscent of Munich, allusions to treason and espionage;
attempts to suppress embarrassing documents, and coincidences in timing too
incredible for fiction—forms an interesting and tragi-comic, although prob-
ably irrelevant, footnote to the history of World War II in the Pacific.
The episode began in June 1940 when David L. Crawford, then President
of the University of Hawaii and an activist in the Hawaii chapter of the
Institute of Pacific Relations, wrote a brief memorandum proposing that the
Institute marshall its influence behind an effort to bring Japan and the United
States together in direct "peace pact" negotiations. Crawford argued that a
meaningful pact might be negotiated and an otherwise inevitable war averted
if each nation would agree to certain concessions and pledges.
The United States, Crawford felt, would have to recognize Manchukuo
(Japan's puppet state in Manchuria), cooperate with Japan in the economic
development of China, cease the construction of fortifications on Guam and
in the Philippines, and remove the Pacific Fleet from Hawaiian waters. At the
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same time, Japan would have to agree to the withdrawal of troops from China
proper and pledge to not invade the Philippines. In addition, he suggested
that both nations would have to negotiate a mutually satisfactory commercial
treaty and jointly pledge their disavowal of any plans to invade either the
Netherland East Indies or any region of the British Commonwealth except
by joint action (emphasis added).3 Unfortunately, he did not specify precisely
what kind of joint action he had in mind.
It goes without saying that Crawford's list of necessary concessions, weighted
in favor of Japan, was hardly calculated to find favor in Washington. Given
the hostile state of Japanese-American relations at this time, the proposal
seems naive in its assumption that Washington might be willing to permit
Japanese control over China and to leave Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines
essentially defenseless. There is virtually nothing in the diplomatic record of
this period suggesting that the United States would have even considered
negotiating a settlement based upon such premises.4
Yet, shallow as it may seem, Crawford's proposal has to be taken with some
degree of seriousness. In the first instance, the author was not a shallow man.
Generally recognized as one of the University of Hawaii's more innovative
leaders, he was neither uniformed on Asian-American relations nor given to
vacuous propositions. Something (but what?) must have led him to believe
that his proposal was firmly grounded.
Even more important in this regard is the fact that the Institute of Pacific
Relations—the organization Crawford worked through—was at this point an
influential force within the international arena. From its founding under
YMCA auspices in Honolulu during the summer of 1925, the organization
had grown to include an international governing body, national councils
in eleven nations (Australia, Canada, China, France, Great Britain, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Soviet Union, and the United
States), and numerous local chapters (such as the Hawaii group) within the
various member nations. Among its participants and supporters, it counted
prominent civic leaders and important policy makers from all but a few mem-
ber nations. When it settled upon a course of action, it could anticipate serious
hearings in London and Washington and lower-level consultation in the
capitals of most of the other member nations. Hence, should Crawford's
proposal have found its way into Institute channels, there is a reasonable
chance that it would have gained the attention of some of the world's leading
policy makers.
For better or worse, Crawford's proposal never reached such levels.
Indeed, there is no evidence that it ever left the hands of the Hawaii group.
Yet it remained very much alive and destined to follow a far stranger course
than would likely have been the case had it entered regular Institute channels.
For a year and a half following its original preparation, it received no recorded
attention. It must, however, have been the subject of some discussion as it
resurfaced late in 1941 in the form of still another proposal—in this instance,
one prepared under the direction of businessman and former Hawaii chapter
Chairman Frank E. Midkiff.
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Midkiff's proposal, without address but obviously written with the Institute
in mind, was only superficially different from its predecessor. Without
specifically mentioning a "peace pact," Midkiff suggested that war might
still be avoided if both Japan and the United States were willing to offer
certain concessions in return for particular guarantees. As a first step, he
suggested that Japan might be induced to withdraw from Indo- China in
return for an American guarantee of oil supplies sufficient to meet "current"
Japanese needs. Next, he speculated that the Japanese withdrawal might
continue to the north bank of China's Yangtze River if the United States
promised to supply Japan with enough steel and cotton to keep her industrial
plants at "current" levels. Achievement of these objectives, he felt, might
lead to a complete Japanese withdrawal from China (but not Manchuria) if the
United States, China, Great Britain, and the Netherlands were willing to sign
an "excellent" commercial treaty with Japan. Among other things, such a
treaty would have to grant Japan preferred status as regards the exploitation
of China's iron and coal reserves. At the same time, the United States would
have to offer Japan a special loan of $500,000,000, presumably as compensation
for relinquished territories and resources. Rounding out the list of concessions
and guarantees, Midkiff concluded that Japan could probably be convinced
to break with the Axis powers in return for American, Chinese, British, and
Soviet recognition of Manchukuo.5
Interesting as Midkiff's proposal itself may be, the course that it took in the
days following its initial preparation is a matter of even greater fascination.
Of special significance here is the manner in which the Hawaii group decided
to advance the proposal and some of the personalities who eventually became
involved in the effort. Rather than submit the document to the regular
machinery of the Institute, the group chose to work solely (and secretly) with
American government officials in an effort to establish direct contact with the
White House. In this regard, the proposal contains a mysterious reference to
encouragement and assistance from a "high ranking military official in the
Territory of Hawaii" who, it is implied, would clear the document through to
the President.6 Had this official been simply one of the numerous ranking
military officials who frequently participated in the group's program of
seminars and conferences, the reference might not warrant serious attention.
This, however, is not the case. It is now known that Midkiff's reference was
in fact to Lt. General Walter C. Short, then commander of Army forces in
Hawaii and co-commander (with Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, who
commanded the Pacific fleet) of all military forces in Hawaii.7 He is, of course,
also the man who would later be charged with much of the responsibility for
the failure to prevent Japan's attack upon Pearl Harbor.
Spurred on by Short's behind-the-scenes assistance, the Hawaii group
subjected Midkiff's proposal to a fast-paced examination in order that it
might be forwarded to Washington at the earliest possible date. Their labors
culminated at a Friday afternoon meeting in Midkiff's downtown Honolulu
business office where the document was to be reviewed for the final time. Nine
people—all of them leaders in the Institute's local chapter—were asked to
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attend.8 Ironically, Midkiff himself was absent as he felt compelled to attend
a meeting of the Honolulu Public Works Committee, and Riley H. Allen, a
well-known Honolulu newspaper editor and the 1940-41 Chairman of the
Hawaii chapter of the Institute, presided in his place.9 While there is no extant
record of the meeting, Midkiff's note to Allen asking him to chair the meeting
conveys the impression that the gathering was to be one of potentially historic
proportions. In the first instance, it might provide a mechanism for halting
the drift toward war in the Pacific. Equally important, it might also have the
effect of hastening the demise of the Third Reich by making it possible for
the Soviet Union to transfer thousands of troops from defensive positions in
Siberia to the crucial European front.10 These are possibilities which must
have excited even the calm businessmen who ran the Institute in Hawaii.
One can speculate that Midkiff's colleagues, finishing up their work late on
that Friday afternoon, reckoned there was no need to rush the document to
the telegraph office for transmission to Washington. As it was late afternoon,
Hawaiian time, they knew the government offices had been closed for several
hours and, with the weekend approaching, there was little likelihood that
anyone would see the message before Monday. So, despite their intense
efforts to finalize the proposal, they must have realized there was no particular
urgency in forwarding it and, hence, postponed the task.11
If all this were indeed the case, their judgment about the lack of urgency
was correct, but for the wrong reason. It was already too late. By incredible
coincidence, that particular Friday happened to be December 5, and Vice
Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's Pearl Harbor Striking Force was rapidly moving
into attack position north of the Hawaiian chain. The "day of infamy" was at
hand, and the Institute's proposal, whatever its wisdom or folly, no longer
mattered. In the days following the Japanese attack, it was simply filed and
forgotten by its sponsors who, to a man, responded to the call for war time
solidarity and assistance. Their effort to halt the drift toward war a failure,
they saw no option save support for the very event they had so recently sought
to avoid.
It would have been better for all concerned had the episode ended on this
tragi-comic note. Unhappily, it did not. Some years after the war, word of the
Institute's peace-making attempt surfaced amidst charges that Midkiff and
his associates had indirectly aided the enemy and had, in effect, been acces-
sories to treason. Compounding the matter, Midkiff chose to attempt a
cover-up of the charges rather than answer them directly.
This unpleasant after event developed in 1949 when Navy Captain Peyton
Harrison—one of many military officers who participated in the Institute's
pre-war program—charged in a "private and confidential" memorandum that
the Hawaii group's entire peace-making effort had, in fact, been instigated by
the "Jap War Lords."12 Harrison, Naval Aide to Hawaii's Governor at the
time he wrote the memorandum, claimed that he had harbored such suspicions
throughout the war and that he had pursued a private investigation of the
matter while in Japan as a member of the post-war occupation force. In the
course of his investigation, Harrison wrote, he contacted a Mr. Kase who had
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worked in the Japanese Foreign Office prior to the war and was responsible
for all contacts with Nagao Kita, Japan's Consul General in Honolulu during
the months prior to the attack upon Pearl Harbor. It is known that Kita did
provide certain intelligence data on ship movements in Pearl Harbor, and
Harrison stated that Kase offered proof that Kita was also responsible for
acts of espionage involving General Short and the Institute. Specifically,
Harrison said that Kase recalled sending Kita a directive ordering him to make
indirect contact with the "Military Commander in Hawaii," suggesting that
he promote a peace plan similar in detail to the one ultimately produced by
Midkiff. Kase also recalled, Harrison noted, that Kita was to suggest that the
actual proposal be issued under Institute auspices.13 In sum, Harrison's
memorandum implied that the Institute was duped into serving Japan's
purposes and that Short was virtually an enemy agent.
While there may be a surface plausibility to Harrison's charges, a lack of
hard evidence renders them dubious. The key issue here concerns the
relationship of Kita, Short, and Midkiff. There is no question but that the
latter two did discuss the peace proposal at some length before it was finalized.
Their conversation was no secret in Institute circles at the time and it is likely
that even Harrison himself knew about it.14 None of this, however, establishes
a treasonable link with Kita. The only proof here is Harrison's report on Kase's
recollections, recollections which Harrison admits were encouraged by "plenty
of good hot saki."15 Furthermore, Harrison demonstrates no knowledge
whatsoever of the original Crawford proposal. Weighing the earlier origins of
this document and the formative role it seems to have played in the preparation
of Midkiff's subsequent proposal against Harrison's undocumented linkage
of Short and Midkiff with Kita and the Japanese Foreign Office, it is difficult
to take Harrison's charges seriously.16
Such a judgment appears to be supported both by the findings of the various
governmental boards and committees which investigated the Pearl Harbor
attack and by the research of various scholars who have studied the event.
Although a large number of investigations were conducted, Harrison appeared
at none of them to state his charges (while his memorandum was not issued
until well after the last investigation was completed, the Congressional
hearings on Pearl Harbor—the most important of all the various investigations
—were under way at the very time he interviewed Kase), and no hearing found
evidence of treasonable activity on the part of any individual or organization.
Nor has any serious scholar found evidence of such activity. Harrison's
charges, in other words, go both unmentioned and unsupported in the
documentation and literature surrounding the Pearl Harbor issue.17 Indeed,
it is worth noting that no mention of any aspect of the Institute's peace-making
effort can be found in the documentation or literature on Pearl Harbor.18
Whatever the shortcomings of these charges, the fact remains that Midkiff
found them unsettling enough to attempt a half-hearted cover-up of Harrison's
original memorandum. Late in 1949, he wrote instructions on the margin of
the Institute's copy of the document to the effect that it should be filed away
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and never again be made available. He did not, as he put it, want to "reopen
this old wound."19
With this act, the entire episode—by now a thoroughly unhappy one—
ground to a halt. It was, at least so far as the participants were concerned,
simply one more item for history's dust bin. Perhaps this is where it does
belong. It involved events which might have had some bearing upon the
course of history but ultimately did not. As such, it ranks as no more than an
inconsequential footnote which may be of passing interest to Hawaiian and
Pacific historians.
There are, however, other perspectives upon this episode which cast it in
a different light. Its lack of either hero or villain illustrates with painful clarity
the oft-repeated proposition that good and evil, insight and myopia, so often
exist side by side in the same person. Histories on a grander scale too often
sweep over this point. More concretely, this episode is also an illustration—one
in a series extending back in time to the Western discovery of the Islands and
forward to the present—of Hawaii's persistent hope of playing a larger-than-
life role in the affairs of the Pacific Basin. Through periods of monarchy,
independence, territorial status, and statehood, no aspect of Hawaiian history
has been more constant than the urge to influence Pacific history. Styles and
tactics have changed over the years—as a comparison of Kalakaua's comic
opera imperialism, the Institute's idealistic internationalism, and the contem-
porary interest in a transcultural Pacific community well demonstrates—but
the urge itself has not.20 Hence, the story of the Institute's peace-making
effort does illustrate a major characteristic of the Hawaiian (and, to a lesser
extent, Pacific) past and probably foretells something of the future. Viewed
in such fashion, it is a story which may in fact be of more than just passing
interest.
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